<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Security on Hanh Pham's Blog</title><link>https://hanh.me/tags/security/</link><description>Recent content in Security on Hanh Pham's Blog</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 09:53:53 +0700</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hanh.me/tags/security/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>The Patch That Isn't There: palera1n and the Rootless Era</title><link>https://hanh.me/posts/ios-jailbreak-rootless-era/</link><pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 09:00:00 +0700</pubDate><guid>https://hanh.me/posts/ios-jailbreak-rootless-era/</guid><description>The modern checkm8 continuation patches code signing, mount policy and task ports, and has no page-protection patch at all. What the gap in its own patch set says about the boundary everyone assumes is being crossed.</description></item><item><title>Most of This Jailbreak Was Never Published: unc0ver and the Userland Era</title><link>https://hanh.me/posts/ios-jailbreak-userland-era/</link><pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 09:00:00 +0700</pubDate><guid>https://hanh.me/posts/ios-jailbreak-userland-era/</guid><description>The bootrom era was unpatchable but fully readable. The userland era inverted both properties: every bug had a fix, and most of the tool&amp;rsquo;s shipped life has no published source at all.</description></item><item><title>One Stale Pointer Before the OS Boots: checkm8 and the Boot ROM Era</title><link>https://hanh.me/posts/ios-jailbreak-bootrom-era/</link><pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 09:00:00 +0700</pubDate><guid>https://hanh.me/posts/ios-jailbreak-bootrom-era/</guid><description>The boot ROM is the one component no update can reach, so a bug in it is a bug in the hardware&amp;rsquo;s own trust anchor. What checkm8 established about unpatchable vulnerabilities, read from the public record rather than from a device.</description></item><item><title>The Reachable Surface: WebKit and the App Layer</title><link>https://hanh.me/posts/ios-webkit-and-app-layer/</link><pubDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 09:30:00 +0700</pubDate><guid>https://hanh.me/posts/ios-webkit-and-app-layer/</guid><description>WebKit and the app layer are the Apple surfaces you can actually study without a research device. How the browser&amp;rsquo;s processes are isolated from each other, what crosses between them, and where a third-party app&amp;rsquo;s own checks sit relative to the server&amp;rsquo;s.</description></item><item><title>iOS Is Not One Boundary: From App Sandbox to Secure Enclave</title><link>https://hanh.me/posts/ios-architecture-from-sandbox-to-secure-enclave/</link><pubDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 10:00:00 +0700</pubDate><guid>https://hanh.me/posts/ios-architecture-from-sandbox-to-secure-enclave/</guid><description>A boundary-first map of the iOS stack, from app sandbox and XPC through XNU subsystems to PAC, SPTM, and the Secure Enclave, with the evidence gates I use before calling anything a finding.</description></item><item><title>An Uncensored Model Is Not a Free Model</title><link>https://hanh.me/posts/uncensored-models-are-a-policy-surface/</link><pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 15:00:00 +0700</pubDate><guid>https://hanh.me/posts/uncensored-models-are-a-policy-surface/</guid><description>Removing refusal behavior from an open model is technically easy. The hard part is proving what changed, containing the new failure modes, and keeping an agent with tools inside a safe boundary.</description></item></channel></rss>